Massachusetts Lawyer Blog

This morning my daughter suggested we take the net (from that game where you hit the thing that looks like an empty ice cream cone) and use it to play volleyball.  I knew immediately she was talking about the net from the old badminton set because the "empty ice cream cone" was certainly the birdie we hit back and forth about a month ago.  In communication and in law context is everything -- both combined can lead to real value.

You shouldn't need to talk in legal mumbo jumbo to get your point across or to achieve the result you desire.  Find a lawyer who knows the law but also gets where you are coming from.  Seek out an attorney who will invest in building a relationship with you.  This is the foundation for providing value -- a real value that seeks to first understand and then meet your needs.  Anything else is just an empty ice cream cone...

While not specific to Massachusetts, a recent AAJ Law News Digest (by email, June 5, 2008) cited three articles illustrating interesting developments in arbitration and law, as well as an interesting poll.

Costs vs. Benefits in Arbitration

In No Room for Error in Arbitration?, Thomas E.L. Dewey and Kara Siegel, New York Law Journal, June 03, 2008, write:

Arbitration of commercial disputes has become increasingly common, due in part to the widely held perception that arbitration is a less expensive and more expeditious method of dispute resolution. Recent court decisions, however, have underscored the fact that those perceived benefits come at a price: the U.S. Supreme Court ruled in April that parties cannot agree to a higher standard of judicial review of arbitration awards, and appeared to question the validity of a long-standing doctrine that does permit courts to overturn arbitration awards that are in "manifest disregard" of the law. The net result: parties who agree to arbitrate their disputes should understand that it will be very difficult to obtain relief from an erroneous arbitration award.

Franchise Concerns in Arbitration

In Pressure Grows to Rethink the Use Of Mandatory-Arbitration Clauses By Richard Gibson, he states:

Most franchise contracts once called for mandatory arbitration of issues, rather than going to court. But these days there is growing pressure -- from franchisees, judges, Congress and even some franchisers -- to rethink that longstanding arrangement. 'The trend toward arbitration has pretty much ended,' says Peter Lagarias, a franchisees' attorney in San Rafael, Calif. Among the concerns is that there is no guaranteed right of appeal. 'You have to take what the arbitrator decides,' says Joshua Becker, an in-house counsel for fast-food franchiser Kahala Corp. For that reason, he says, Kahala, whose brands include Blimpie submarine sandwiches and TacoTime, favors resolving issues with franchisees in court."

Doctors Not Treating Patients without Arbitration

The Tampa Tribune Editorial, New 'Hello' In Health Care: Sign Here Not To Sue, states:

"It's not uncommon today for a woman visiting her gynecologist to give up her right to sue if something goes wrong. The doctor simply won't treat her unless she agrees to take any potential claim to an arbitration panel rather than the courts. The same goes for many acute-care hospitals and nursing homes, where stressed-out families with little choice are handed 60-odd pages of documents to sign. Sandwiched near the end, the mandatory-arbitration agreement gets the briefest of explanations. Binding arbitration - not health precautions and explanations - is the new 'hello' in health care. It's a physician's answer to the threat of litigation and the high cost of malpractice insurance. Like some trial lawyers who have convinced clients to sign away their constitutional rights to limited legal fees, doctors are getting patients to sign away their constitutional right to sue, too. This troubling new practice is a barrier to the doctor-patient relati onship, akin to signing a pre-nuptial agreement before getting married. The practice is a form of blackmail: Sign it or get out."

Consumer Poll Results on Arbitration

The AAJ on their webites provide the article, New Poll: Americans Say “No Thanks” To Binding Arbitration:

Washington, DC—Americans generally disapprove of binding arbitration provisions in consumer contracts as an alternative to civil legal proceedings involving a judge or jury, according to a recent national poll by survey firm Peter D. Hart Research Associates Inc.

“Mandatory binding arbitration doesn’t give consumers a choice,” said American Association for Justice President Kathleen Flynn Peterson. “This poll proves that when asked to choose, consumers overwhelmingly say ‘no thanks’ to unfair arbitration agreements. Arbitration can only be a valid and effective method of resolving disputes when both parties agree voluntarily.”

Consumers are sometimes required to sign a contract with a company when purchasing products or services ranging from cell phones to nursing home care. These contracts often include a binding arbitration provision which states the consumer agrees to have any dispute with the company decided by an arbitrator, rather than by a judge or jury in a civil legal proceeding.

Binding arbitration has even been enforced in nursing home deaths. Massachusetts resident John Donahue suffered an eye injury so severe that it required removal of his eye while under the care of a nursing home. The infection caused by his injury eventually led to his death. When his daughter Marlene Owens went to file a claim against the nursing home corporation she was told that her father signed a binding arbitration agreement without any family members present. The nursing home insists that the case be taken to arbitration and the case is currently pending.

According to the polling, when consumers learn that the company picks the arbitrator, and they give up their right to take the case to court and binding arbitration applies even if they are seriously injured, 81 percent disapprove.

The poll also shows broad support for Congressional legislation called the “Arbitration Fairness Act” that seeks to protect Americans from abusive arbitration agreements. The legislation would ensure that the decision to arbitrate be made voluntarily and after a dispute has arisen. In addition, the legislation enjoys very strong support across party lines with no statistically significant differences between Democrats (+38) and Republicans (+37).

Last week, the U.S. House and Senate passed The Food, Conservation and Energy Act of 2008 conference agreement containing a voluntary arbitration provision which would allow farmers to opt out of binding mandatory arbitration clauses at the time they sign a contract with a processing company. The enactment of this provision would mark a significant step forward for farmers who are subject to these abusive contracts.

Summary

Is arbitration right for you? What are your downsides and upsides? These are questions to consider anytime you're faced with an arbitration clause or are considering including one in your contracts. The larger issues remains, are forced arbitration agreements fair and should they be allowed under law? It appears both consumers and companies are now giving this some additional thought.

Something to think about the next time a defense expert or doctor treats a car accident victim with disdain. Perhaps they don’t really dislike the injured person (who they’re showing disgust towards). Maybe they’ve just been coached by the insurance company’s defense lawyer as part of the “litigation plan.”

Although not from Massachusetts, defense attorney Jenifer L. Kienle generally discusses how mental health professionals and experts should be coached to avoid forming favorable impressions of an injured car accident victim. In her article, “The New Science of Stress - Why Defending a Fender Bender Lawsuit When the Plaintiff Claims Post Traumatic Stress Syndrome Requires a New Litigation Plan,” she states:

Finally, choosing a defense expert also requires an understanding that treaters in the mental health field frequently become involved with a patient, and while exploring their personality, subconsciously begin to "like" the plaintiff. … be alert to any defense expert who, after spending considerable time interviewing the plaintiff, reports his/her impression of the plaintiff in complimentary terms. This may be a sign the expert's professional judgment (and ultimate diagnosis) is impeded by favorable feelings toward the plaintiff. Avoid this trap with early, frequent and candid discussions with the expert so that his/her favorable impressions of the plaintiff can be managed. [bold added for emphasis]

If you’ve been injured in a car accident, the stress can be real. It can cause anxiety, loss of sleep, fear of driving, and many other emotional and physical symptoms. Don’t ever let a supposed "expert" make you feel bad or question the legitimacy of what you are going through. You’ve suffered enough and it wasn’t your fault. Remember, even though they’re “professionals” they’re not being paid to like you. As you can see from above, some "defense experts" are even being coached to ensure they don’t. They're not being genuine and they're not playing fair, you need an advocate who can understand what you're going through and who isn't afraid to challenge the defense expert's bias or the people who pay them.

Whether you’re a passenger, driver, or pedestrian in a Massachusetts auto accident, the insurance issues can be tricky. It’s not uncommon for someoe injured in a car accident to go see a medical provider thinking their medical care should be covered by the person who caused their accident. If it’s not covered, they believe their medical insurance company should cover the bills. After all, that's why we pay so much for all this insurance, right? But did you know that thinking the insurance issues are simple and will take care of themselves could lead to receiving big bills for unpaid medical expenses?

The failure to take the right steps with insurance coverage in MA accidents can lead to a bill going unpaid and later ending up in collection. This is not a good result for someone who was injured by another in a car accident. Here’s a very basic overview for someone injured in an accident. (For simplicity sake, I’ll assume no time was missed from work, but that’s a bad assumption for lawyers to make in most serious car accidents.)

The first $2,000 in medical bills should be paid by your Auto Insurer’s Motor Vehicle Personal Injury Protection (PIP) insurance benefits. If you have health insurance, then your health insurance provider should pay for claims beyond the first $2,000 unless you have MedPay benefits under your auto insurance policy. If you have MedPay, a recent case confirms your health insurer may defer coverage to the MedPay insurer and the MedPay policy should pay until it maxes out its payments in accordance with the policy. Then, your health insurer would make the remaining payments. For the purposes of this post, I won’t get into how these issues also relate to settlements and trials.

No matter what, however, don't make the costly mistake of going outside your health insurance plan or you risk having to pay for the medical services out of your own pocket. “[E]ven when there is health insurance, PIP does not cover claims denied by a health insurance provider because the insured has failed to comply with the health insurance contract, for example by seeking out-of-network care.” Dominguez v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 429 Mass. 112, 115-117 (1999).

If you don’t have health insurance, then your PIP benefits should pay the first $8,000 in claims and if you have MedPay benefits, it should pay until the coverage limit is reached.

The interplay of PIP, MedPay and Health Insurer issues was recently addressed with the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) concluding there is “… nothing in the statutory language governing PIP or MedPay to prohibit health insurers from deferring coverage due to the existence of MedPay benefits...” Metropolitan Property and Casualty Insurance Company vs. Blue Shield of Massachusetts, Inc. SJC-09944 (slip opinion)

Justice Bostford, writing for the court, provides a statutory framework of the insurance issues raised.

Statutory framework. The Massachusetts "no-fault" insurance plan, adopted in 1970, originally provided for PIP benefits (up to $2,000) to be paid in place of tort recovery for injuries that caused less than $500 in medical expenses. See § 34A (defining "[p]ersonal injury protection"), as amended through St. 1970, c. 670, §§ 1, 2; G. L. c. 90, § 34M, inserted by St. 1970, c. 670, § 4; G. L. c. 231, § 6D, inserted by St. 1970, c. 670, § 5. See also Pinnick v. Cleary, 360 Mass. 1, 5-10 (1971). In 1988, in an effort to bring the statutory amounts in line with escalating medical costs and further to control automobile insurance premiums, the Legislature increased the tort threshold to $2,000 and increased PIP coverage to $8,000, but provided that PIP would pay only the first $2,000 in medical expenses in cases where the insured also had health insurance that would cover expenses above that amount. See § 34A, as amended through St. 1988, c. 273, §§ 15-16; G. L. c. 231, § 6D, as amended by St. 1988, c. 273, § 55. See also Creswell v. Medical W. Community Health Plan, Inc., 419 Mass. 327, 329-330 (1995). This "coordination of benefits" scheme providing for the sharing of costs between automobile and health insurers is expressed in two sentences in the final paragraph of § 34A:

"[P]ersonal injury protection provisions shall not provide for payment of more than two thousand dollars of expenses incurred within two years from the date of accident for [medical and funeral services] if, and to the extent that, such expenses have been or will be compensated, paid or indemnified pursuant to any policy of health, sickness or disability insurance . . . . No policy of health, sickness or disability insurance . . . shall deny coverage for said expenses because of the existence of personal injury protection benefits."

§ 34A, as amended through St. 1988, c. 273, § 16. Under these provisions, PIP only covers medical expenses above $2,000 if they are not covered by health insurance. Moreover, even when there is health insurance, PIP does not cover claims denied by a health insurance provider because the insured has failed to comply with the health insurance contract, for example by seeking out-of-network care. Dominguez v. Liberty Mut. Ins. Co., 429 Mass. 112, 115-117 (1999).

MedPay benefits are not part of the statutory scheme that established the no-fault system with its central feature of PIP benefits. Since 1943, G. L. c. 175, § 111C, has authorized, for various types of liability insurance policies, including automobile policies, optional endorsements to provide coverage for reasonable medical and related expenses. G. L. c. 175, § 111C, inserted by St. 1943, c. 375, § 1. Beginning in 1968, however, under G. L. c. 175, § 113C, automobile insurers doing business in the Commonwealth have been required to offer every person purchasing a policy the option of purchasing "medical coverage, so called . . . to a limit of at least five thousand dollars." G. L. c. 175, § 113C, as amended by St. 1968, c. 643, § 3. This obligation to offer optional medical, or MedPay, benefits is reflected in Part 6 of the standard Massachusetts automobile insurance policy (policy). In particular, Part 6 of the seventh edition of the policy, applicable to the accident in this case, provides in relevant part: "Under this Part, we will pay reasonable expenses for necessary medical and funeral services incurred as a result of an accident. . . . We must sell you limits of $5,000 per person if you want to buy them." Thus, it appears that G. L. c. 175, § 111C, authorizes automobile insurers to offer MedPay coverage, and G. L. c. 175, § 113C, requires them to do so. Accord Morin v. Massachusetts Blue Cross, Inc., 365 Mass. 379, 385 & n.5 (1974).
[Footnotes deleted]

In the end, it’s important to realize protecting your case (and your credit rating) is not simply about liability but also requires dealing with complicated insurance issues. Failure to take the right steps in a Massachusetts auto accident can lead to collections efforts against you and ultimately to you paying out of pocket for an injury (even when you were a passenger or completely blameless.)

A study entitled Legal Liability: The Consequences of School Injury in the Journal of School Health, May 2007, Vol. 77, No. 5, (Abstract only) examined cases involving schools, lawsuits, and injuries. Schools paid awards about 2/3 of the time, either by verdict (26.8%) or settlement (40.4%). The average case lasted just under 4 years from the time of injury to the case’s resolution by trial or settlement. Surprisingly, they found it difficult to predict the cases resulting in an award, stating: “this study found no difference on any case characteristics between cases that resulted in awards and those that did not.”

They authors concluded,

Many of the injuries documented in this study may have been prevented through better maintenance of school facilities, equipment and playing fields; addition of safety features and equipment; improved supervision of students; education of school officials, students, and parents; and enforcement of building codes and rules, especially during sports and recreational activity.

Award Range: $1 to $15,398,762; Mean: $562,915; Median: $50,000; 25th percentile: $9,750; and 75th percentile: $300,000.

Public records can be helpful in government matters but also for business purposes, in automobile and personal injury cases, or many others types of litigation.

People sometime ask, "How do I get a copy of a local government record?" In Massachusetts, the Secretary of State has published A Guide to the Massachusetts Public Records Law, updated January 2008.

Records are presumed public unless they fall under one of sixteen exclusions, but fees may be charged to obtain them.

The difference between the federal Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) and the Massachusetts Public Records Law is FOIA applies to federal records while the Massachusetts Public Records Law applies to state and local records.

Bruce Selya, a judge since 2005 with the 1st U.S. Circuit Court of Appeals has been named chief judge of The U.S Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review. This court handles appeals over wiretaps of suspected terrorists or spies. It was created to hear government appeals when lower courts reject the government's application.

The Providence Journal reports Selya will take over as chief judge on May 19 and his term will run through 2012. Selya, from Rhode Island, was a federal judge before being appointed to the Federal Appeals Court in 1986.

A Congressional Research Service Report, The U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court
and the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review: An Overview, dated January 24, 2007, by Elizabeth B. Bazan, Legislative Attorney, American Law Division provides a 15 page report. The Report's Summary states:

The national debate regarding the National Security Agency’s Terrorist Surveillance Program (TSP) focused congressional attention on the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court and the U.S. Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review created by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act. Congressional interest in these courts has been heightened by the January 17, 2007, letter from Attorney General Gonzales to Chairman Leahy and Senator Specter advising them that a Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court judge had “issued orders authorizing the Government to target for collection international communications into or out of the United States where there is probable cause to believe that one of the communicants is a member or agent of al Qaeda or an associated terrorist organization,” stating that all surveillance previously occurring under the TSP will now be conducted subject to the approval of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court, and noting that the President has determined not to reauthorize the TSP when the current authorization expires. This report examines the creation, membership, structure, and jurisdiction of these courts. It will be updated as subsequent events may require.

Wikipedia gives a general overview of the topic,

The United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court of Review is a U.S. federal court authorized under 50 U.S.C. § 1803 and established by the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act of 1978 (known as FISA for short). It is a three judge panel whose sole purpose is to review denials of applications for electronic surveillance warrants (called FISA warrants) by the United States Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court (or FISC). Each judge of the FISC, in turn, has the jurisdiction to oversee requests for surveillance warrants by federal police agencies (primarily the F.B.I.) against suspected foreign intelligence agents inside the United States. Any appeals from the Court of Review are made directly to the Supreme Court. Like a grand jury, the Court of Review is not an adversarial court; rather, the only party to the court is the federal government, although other parties may submit briefs as amici curiae. Records of the proceedings are kept, but they are classified, although copies of the proceedings with sensitive information redacted may be made public.

The judges of the Court of Review are district or appellate federal judges, appointed by the Chief Justice of the United States for seven year terms. The terms are staggered so that there are at least two years between consecutive appointments. A judge may be appointed only once to either this court or the FISC.

The Court of Review was called into session for the first time in 2002 in a case referred to as "In Re Sealed Case No. 02-001". The FISC had granted a FISA warrant to the F.B.I., but had placed restrictions on its use; specifically, the F.B.I. was denied the ability to use evidence gathered under the warrant in criminal cases. The Court of Review allowed a coalition of civil liberties groups, including the American Civil Liberties Union and the Electronic Frontier Foundation, to file briefs as amici curiae arguing against the F.B.I's new surveillance regulations. The Court of Review held that the restrictions that the FISC had placed on the warrant violated both FISA and the USA PATRIOT Act and that there was no constitutional requirement for those restrictions.

Current composition of the court listed by Name, Circuit, Appointed, Expiration of Appointment Edward Leavy (presiding), Ninth, September 25, 2001, May 18, 2008 Ralph K. Winter, Jr., Second, May 18, 2003, May 18, 2010 Bruce Marshall Selya, First, October 8, 2005, May 18, 2012 List of former judges Laurence H. Silberman, D.C., May 18, 1996, May 18, 2003 Ralph B. Guy, Jr., Sixth, October 8, 1998, May 18, 2005 The exact dates of Judge Silberman's tenure are uncertain.

In 2002, Anita Ramasastry, an Assistant Professor of Law at the University of Washington School of Law in Seattle and the Associate Director of the Shidler Center for Law, Commerce & Technology wrote a critcal review entitled, "THE FOREIGN INTELLIGENCE SURVEILLANCE COURT OF REVIEW CREATES A POTENTIAL END RUN AROUND TRADITIONAL FOURTH AMENDMENT PROTECTIONS FOR CERTAIN CRIMINAL LAW ENFORCEMENT WIRETAPS"

While "A history of Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Court" indicates:

Continue reading "AP Reports Federal appeals judge in Boston named top judge of wiretap court" »