Massachusetts Lawyer Blog

What happens in Massachusetts when someone dies but their will can’t be found?

This question was recently addressed by the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) in the Matter of the Estate of Marc R. Beauregard. Beauregard who died at age 40, unmarried, and childless, lived at the same address as Steven Knight.

Beauregard’s father was appointed as administrator of his estate, but Knight filed a petition to probate a “copy” of a will where significant property was left to Knight. Beauregard’s parents and siblings objected to Knight’s filing of the copy and litigation ensued.

The probate trial judge found Beauregard had, in fact, executed a will which had been witnessed by two persons in accordance with M.G.L. c. 191, § 1, and had kept the original himself. Five weeks after the will was executed, however, Beauregard was murdered. No will was found.

Continue reading "Massachusetts Probate Cases Involving a Lost Will: Evidentiary Presumptions Rise Again" »

The Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC) recently ruled (slip opinion) on an MA employment discrimination case involving a general arbitration clause. The contract between the employee and employer stated,

Arbitration. Any claim, controversy or dispute arising out of or in connection with this Agreement or its negotiations shall be settled by arbitration. ...

The plaintiff/employee (the former chief of anesthesiology at Beth Israel Deaconess Medical Center, Inc.), filed an action in Superior Court alleging gender-based discrimination and retaliation (and other related claims.) The defendants/employers (Beth Isreal Deaconess Medical Center and others) tried to compel arbitration arguing the employment agreement mandated arbitration. The SJC disagreed and held the contract's arbitration provision did not apply to the employee's employment discrimination claims,

an employment contract containing an agreement by the employee to limit or waive any of the rights or remedies conferred by c. 151B [discrimination] is enforceable only if such an agreement is stated in clear and unmistakable terms. ....

parties to an employment contract are free to agree on arbitration of statutory discrimination claims, and the presumption of arbitrability is in effect. However, parties seeking to provide for arbitration of statutory discrimination claims must, at a minimum, state clearly and specifically that such claims are covered by the contract's arbitration clause.

In this instance, general language won't work, but specific language will. The decision creates a bit of a challenge for anyone relying on existing arbitration clauses. Which claims are included in a general agreement to arbitrate and which aren't? On the employer side, look for a new addendum to employment contracts. One that lists (with specificity) any and all types of cases that can be arbitrated. The dissent by Justice Cowin states,

We can only wonder what type of claims will be singled out next for such treatment.

Technorati Tags: Federal Arbitration Act, Massachusetts Arbitration Act, Anti-Discrimination Law, Arbitration, Employment. Contract, Arbitration, Employment, Discrimination, Civil, Interlocutory appeal, Public Policy

Sarah Randag, recently posted on the ABA Journal a labor and employment law post, LinkedIn Reviews Can Come Back to Haunt Employers, Lawyers Say, which opens with,

Management-side employment lawyers are advising their clients against writing recommendations for current or recent employees on LinkedIn.

The same argument could be made on Facebook, Twitter, or any other social media web site.  Does your company have a social media policy? If so, are you tracking or keeping a record of what is being said, if anything, about your employees by their managers on the web? Do you prefer to not know? When workplace disputes arise, do you see if anything has been brought up or mentioned on the web. If so, and you discover something online, are you dealing with it in a way that could lead to litigation down the road? On a related issue, if an employee complains to you about another employee's postings on the web, are you prepared to respond? With changes in communication methods and technology's quickening pace come new and constant challenges to consider when employment issues arise.

Technorati Tags: employment, law, LinkedIn, review, handbook

Modification of a MA child support order was recently discussed in the Massachusetts Appeals Court case, Kenneth R. Whelan vs. Kathleen A. Whelan. One of the issues discussed in this case involved self-employment income as it relates to MA child support obligations. In a footnote, Note (17), the court writes:

(17) New Child Support Guidelines became effective in Massachusetts on January 1, 2009. The new Guidelines define income as "gross income from whatever source regardless of whether that income is recognized by the Internal Revenue Code or reported to the Internal Revenue Service or State Department of Revenue or other taxing authority." Guidelines I-A (2009). With respect to income from self-employment, the new Guidelines provide that "[i]n general, income and expenses from self- employment or operation of a business should be carefully reviewed to determine the appropriate level of gross income available to the parent to satisfy a child support obligation. In many cases this amount will differ from a determination of business income for tax purposes." Guidelines I-C (2009).

While the prior Child Support Guidelines, "do not specifically provide for deduction of business-related expenses from self-employment income[,]" the court indicated the new MA Child Support Guidelines "clarify" the approach MA courts have taken.

The 2006 Guidelines, in effect at the time of trial, do not specifically provide for deduction of business-related expenses from self-employment income. Indeed, these guidelines list in the definition of income from whatever source both "income from self-employment" as well as, by way of comparison, "net rental income." Guidelines I-A(1), (25) (2006). Nevertheless, we think it is implicit that such expenses may be deducted where they are reasonable and necessary for the production of income, and our decisional law supports this conclusion. See, e.g., Smith-Clarke v. Clarke, 44 Mass. App. Ct. 404, 406 (1998) (due to lack of substantiation and commingling of personal and business expenditures, judge properly could disregard certain claimed business deductions from husband's gross income or substitute a reasonable figure for others); Maillet v. Maillet, 64 Mass. App. Ct. 683, 689-690 (2005) (remand ordered where financial statement of husband, sole owner of business, set forth income of $800 per week, and "his corporation in 2002 had income of $227,744 exclusive of suspended losses and depreciation").

The court reasoned the test to be applied by a judge in determining income from self-employment is,

...whether claimed business deductions are reasonable and necessary to the production of income, without regard to whether those deductions may be claimed for Federal or State income tax purposes.

While the MA Child Support Guidelines help bring a degree of certainty to Massachusetts child support orders, this case shows the numbers one uses in the child support formula may not necessarily be the same as income reported on tax forms or found in business reports. In self-employment and investment income cases, it's important to be able to articulate what income and expenses should be taken into consideration in determining the income which should be entered into the child support worksheet.

Technorati Tags: MA Divorce, Modification, Self-Employment, Income, Modification

Thank you to the Patriot Ledger and Reporter Julie Onufrak for covering my Privacy Law and Policy Blog in today's business section, Weymouth lawyer blogging about the Internet and privacy. It was a pleasure to meet Julie and we had an interesting discussion on the future of media, blogs, newspapers, as well as privacy issues.

The U.S. Supreme Court in, Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts (PDF), concludes, "[t]he Sixth Amendment does not permit the prosecution to prove its case via ex parte out-of-court affidavits[.]" Thus, MA defendants and defense attorneys will now be allowed to challenge the prosecutions' evidence prepared for trial by questioning the person who prepared a forensic report or analysis. SCOTUS Blog's analysis of the MA case states,

Expressing a heavy dose of skepticism that crime lab reports are so reliable as to be beyond question, the Supreme Court on Thursday cleared the way for chemists and other scientists who prepare such reports to be summoned to the witness stand in criminal trials to defend their analysis.  The 5-4 ruling in Melendez-Diaz v. Massachusetts (07-591) resulted from some unusual alliances among the Justices, and continued the deep division within the Court over how to interpret the Constitution’s guarantee that an individual on trial for a crime has a right to face and challenge the witnesses for the prosecution.

Justice Antonin Scalia, writing for the majority, found this case to follow the court's precedent expressed in Crawford v. Washington. In laying the framework, Scalia states:

The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution, made applicable to the States via the Fourteenth Amendment, Pointer v. Texas, 380 U. S. 400, 403 (1965), provides that “[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right . . . to be confronted with the witnesses against him.” In Crawford, after reviewing the Clause’s historical underpinnings, we held that it guarantees a defendant’s right to confront those “who ‘bear testimony’” against him. 541 U. S., at 51. A witness’s testimony against a defendant is thus inadmissible unless the witness appears at trial or, if the witness is unavailable, the defendant had a prior opportunity for cross-examination. Id., at 54.

See the SCOTUS Wiki for more on this case.

Technorati Tags: MA, Confrontation, Defense, Supreme Court, Forensic

Law and business clients often ask, "Have we reached the bottom, yet?" The number of bankruptcy inquiries, loan workout requests, short-sale questions, employment termination calls, and divorce consultations our law firm is receiving makes me believe we have not reached the bottom yet.

Local economic statistics referenced in three recent Boston Business Journal's (BBJ) articles make  me further believe that my anecdotal evidence isn't merely anecdotal. The BBJ's, May's home sales near 20-year low, adds,

This report shows that home sales are still slow in Massachusetts. In the late 1990s and into the early part of this century, the state was averaging over 5,000 single-family home sales during the month of May. Last month, we saw fewer than 3,300 home sales, making it the lowest sales pace for the month of May in almost two decades,” said Timothy M. Warren Jr., chief executive officer of The Warren Group, in a statement.

Further, a BBJ article from last week, Mass. foreclosures slipped 59% in May indicates that while foreclosure deeds dropped compared to last year,

...the number of foreclosure petitions filed in May was six times the 390 petitions filed the same month a year ago. Foreclosure petitions mark the start of the foreclosure process in Massachusetts. In addition, the number of foreclosure petitions climbed 15.7 percent from 2,013 in April.

And finally, another BBJ article from last week, Mass. unemployment rate hits 8.2 percent, adds:

Massachusetts’ unemployment rate inched up to 8.2 percent in May, as local employers reported 111,100 fewer workers on their payrolls when compared to the year-earlier period.

No, I'm afraid it appears we have not reached the bottom yet and perhaps we may not for some time...

... we take this opportunity to stress that we have no doubt that self-settled, irrevocable trusts may, if so structured, so insulate trust assets that those assets will be deemed unavailable to the settlor. ... Muriel's trust is a carefully crafted, entirely appropriate estate planning device. But neither the trust's validity nor her good intentions determine the present question. In our view, Muriel's trust, as structured, allows the trustees a degree of discretionary authority that would, if sanctioned, permit Muriel to enjoy her assets, preserve those assets for her heirs, and receive public assistance, to, in effect, "have [her] cake and eat it too." ... Congress has declared a contrary intent, that Medicaid benefits be made available only to those who genuinely lack sufficient resources to provide for themselves. We perceive no reason in this case to deviate from that mandate.

MURIEL DOHERTY vs. DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF MEDICAID, Essex Docket No. 08-P-939.

This case shows the importance of the entire trust document as a whole and the importance of not simply relying on certain provisions or words to protect assets.

Technorati Tags: Medicaid. Trust, Irrevocable trust, Self-settled trust, Distribution, Trustee's discretion

In Coombes v. Florio, 450 Mass. 182 (2007), a physician owed a duty of reasonable care to those foreseeability put at risk by a doctor’s failure to warn the patient of the side effects of the patient's treatment. In Coombes a young boy was struck and killed by a car driven by one taking medications, but who had neither been warned of the medications' side effects, nor been told not to drive while taking these medications. See Massachusetts Bar Association review of Coombes. Thus, liability under Coombes could be extended and include those not having any doctor-patient relationship. A recent case dealing with negligence, duty, and foreseeability sought to expand this holding even further, but it was unsuccessful before the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court (SJC).

In Leavitt vs. Brockton Hospital, Inc., Sheila Smith and Karen Sullivan (slip opinion), a pedestrian involved in a car accident had undergone a colonoscopy earlier in the day and was walking home from Brockton Hospital when struck by another vehicle. While heading to the accident's location, a Whitman police cruiser was hit by another vehicle resulting in an officer being seriously and permanently injured. The police officer sued the hospital for negligence claiming they had breached their duty of care, among other things, when they released the previously sedated patient without an escort. The Supreme Judicial Court agreed the case had been properly dismissed by a lower court and upheld that court's decision.

In a footnote, the court noted the different standards for reviewing a motion to dismiss because the standard had changed from the time of the judge's ruling to the time of the SJC's review. Regardless, the court opined this case would have failed under either standard.

After the judge had ruled on the hospital's motion to dismiss, we adopted as applicable to our civil rules the United States Supreme Court's revision of the standard for reviewing the adequacy of a complaint challenged by a motion to dismiss pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 12 (b) (6). See Iannacchino v. Ford Motor Co., 451 Mass. 623, 635-636 (2008), quoting Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 127 S. Ct. 1955, 1966 (2007) ("What is required at the pleading stage are factual 'allegations plausibly suggesting [not merely consistent with]' an entitlement to relief . . ."). The hospital does not ask that we apply the new, "stricter" standard. See Flomenbaum v. Commonwealth, 451 Mass. 740, 751 n.12 (2008). The complaint would not survive the hospital's motion to dismiss under either standard.

Technorati Tags: negligence, duty, police, hospital, Coombes

Does your Massachusetts divorce agreement have a provision that addresses disagreements regarding the college selection process or does it tightly define what are reasonable education costs? Perhaps it should. With a number of colleges now above $50,000/year for each child, and the economy where it's at, disputes over education expenses are likely to be on the rise for some time.

What are "reasonable college expenses" and what happens when parents disagree during the college selection process? The answer depends on many factors, holds a MA Appeals Court in Paula A. Mandel vs. Shawn W. Mandel. The court introduced the Mandel case as follows:

In 1996, the parties, Paula Mandel and Shawn Mandel, obligated themselves...to each pay for one-half of their daughters' "college education expenses." The provision contained no further explanation regarding cost or choice of school, although another...provision provided both parents with the right to participate fully in their daughters' activities and with input into educational decisions. A decade later, their older daughter enrolled at a private university costing approximately $34,000 a year. The parties never reached an agreement on payment, and when Shawn refused to pay fifty percent of the cost, Paula initiated contempt proceedings against him. A Probate and Family Court judge eventually found that Paula and the child had selected a school "financially out of reach" for Shawn and ordered him to pay approximately one-quarter of the expenses of the private college. On appeal, Paula claims the judge erred by not requiring Shawn to pay one-half of the expenses actually incurred. Shawn argues that the judge properly limited his obligation to the expenses he would have paid had the child attended a State university.

In Mandel, the court ultimately held that further proceedings, regarding the reasonableness of the college expenses in these circumstances, are required. Some of the specific terms in the Mandel Agreement included,

Both parents shall participate fully in providing access to the child and her activities, and input into educational, medical, behavioral and other significant decisions affecting the child.
...

The Husband and Wife shall each contribute 50% toward each child's college education expenses, including, but not limited to, room, board, tuition, books, fees and other normal educational expenses.

Are reasonable education costs measured using public school costs as the standard, or are they the actual costs at a private school?  Or, is it something different altogether? In addressing these questions, the court reviewed "all relevant equitable factors" which courts have considered in examining the educational needs of the child and the financial circumstances of the parents, including:

• Financial resources of both parents;
• Standard of living the child would have enjoyed if the marriage had not been dissolved;
• Financial resources of the child;
• Cost of the school;
• Programs offered at the school;
• Child's scholastic aptitude;
• How the school meets the child's goals;
• Benefits the child will receive from attending the school;
• Parents' standard of living," which in some cases "includes the ability to provide certain opportunities...such as private school education"; and
• Massachusetts Child Support Guidelines, encouraging "joint parental responsibility for child support in proportion to, or as a percentage of, income."

An additional factor mentioned by the court in its opinion considers the college decision making process,

the extent to which [a party] unjustifiably may have been excluded from the [college] decision-making process.

But it appears timing, or taking some action during the process, is also an important factor,

Conversely, a party who has sat on his or her right to intervene, or to seek approval from the court when the parties disagree, until the college selection process has been completed, may have waived his or her right to object to the college and its concomitant cost.

So at the end of the day, the answer is, "it depends" and thus will require further litigation to answer the question as to what is reasonable under the circumstances. Knowing this analysis could be waiting for you in a divorce, do you prefer to take steps now to lock down these issues in a divorce agreement or leave them open for later interpretation. If later, are there any special considerations you want included in your agreement?

Divorce and education disputes are likely to be on the rise, as the court noted in a footnote,

Disagreement itself is not surprising. "With the explosive growth in the cost of financing a college education, the issue of who will pay those costs after the divorce of the parents is becoming increasingly acute." 2 Kindregan & Inker, Family Law and Practice § 39:50, at 830 (3d ed. 2002). Overall, college tuition and fees have increased 439 percent from 1982 to 2007, adjusted for inflation. National Center for Public Policy and Higher Education, Measuring Up 2008: The National Report Card on Higher Education 8 (2008). The difference between college costs at different types of universities is also significant. According to the National Association of State Universities and Land-Grant Colleges(NASULGC), tuition and fees averaged about $3,200 for community colleges and $33,000 for private research universities in 2006-2007. NASULGC, University Tuition, Consumer Choice and College Affordability: Strategies for Addressing a Higher Education Affordability Challenge 14, 85 (2008).

Technorati Tags: Divorce, Separation, Separation agreement, Child support, Modification, Child support, Education, Reasonable college expenses, Massachusetts, divorce agreement

My new Privacy Law and Policy blog is underway. This blog examines privacy law issues that include:

• Privacy Rights
• Privacy Invasions
• Security Breaches and Crimes
• Open Government

I help individuals in civil and criminal matters and represents municipalities and businesses in privacy compliance matters, security breaches, commercial privacy infringements, cybercrimes, and crimes involving privacy issues.

You can also follow Kevin Whitaker on Twitter at http://twitter.com/kevinwhitaker

Massachusetts attorney Kevin Whitaker's new Privacy Law and Policy Blog is live.

Technorati Tags: Privac, Privacy Law, Privacy Lawyer, Privacy Attorney

In Kennedy, an estate tried to recover $402,000 that was paid to an ex-spouse.  In the divorce, the wife gave up her rights to the husband's pension or other work-related benefits. However, the husband failed to remove his ex-wife as the beneficiary of his investment plan assets. Following his death, the funds went to the ex-spouse. Prior to this Supreme Court decision, various courts had reached different conclusions about this type of issue (This post follows my prior post, Rolling Over in His Grave--Another Lesson in Costly Beneficiary Form Mistakes.)

The Court, in Kennedy, found plan benefits can be waived under a divorce decree, however, "...the plan administrator did its statutory ERISA duty by paying the benefits to [the ex-spouse] in conformity with the plan documents.”

So the ex-spouse keeps the money, or does she? A footnote indicates the estate might still be able to pursue an action against the ex-spouse to recover the funds. An analysis at the Scotus Wiki states,

The Court, in a footnote, left open the question of whether the estate could have sued to recover the benefits from Liv after she received them. The footnote mentioned prior rulings that seemed to say that a prior contractual agreement to forfeit funds may be enforceable after the distribution without violating ERISA; once the money is paid out, it loses its ERISA protection, those rulings had indicated.

Beneficiary designation forms may appear simple, but think twice about how your estate plan or divorce relates to them.

Technorati Tags: estate, divorce, beneficiary form, ERISA